博弈视角下的跨国公司联盟稳定性研究  

A Study of the Stability of Transnational Corporations Alliances Based on Game Theory

作　　者：宋斐然[1] 利龑[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东管理学院劳动关系学院,山东济南250100 [2]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2016年第1期72-78,共7页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"管理者风格与企业投融资决策研究"(项目编号:13BJY083)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：近年来,越来越多跨国公司通过缔结战略联盟实现资源共享、风险共担,以期在全球化的科技与经济竞争中占据优势地位。战略联盟是否稳定,对跨国公司的生存、成长以及发展壮大都起到至关重要的作用。研究首先通过理论分析提取出代表跨国公司联盟特征的变量;其次,选择古诺模型作为初始模型,将变量带入其中计算出联盟企业最大化利润;再次,以囚徒困境博弈为基础,求出一次博弈和多次博弈的均衡解;最后,根据对博弈结果的分析,为跨国公司建立稳定的战略联盟提供管理启示。In recent years, more and more transnational corporations construct strategic alliances to achieve resource and risk sharing so as to dominate in the global competition of science and technology. The stability of transnational corporations alliances plays a vital role in the survival,growth and development of the transnational corporations. This study firstly derives the key variables that represent the characteristics of the transnational corporations alliances, then uses the Cournot model as initial model to calculate the maximum profit of alliances, and then, the equilibrium solutions of one - shot and repeated game are calculated based on the Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game. Finally, according to the analysis of the results of the game, some managerial illuminations are proposed to establish stable strategic alliances for transnational corporations.

关 键 词：跨国公司 联盟稳定性 博弈论 

分 类 号：F276.7[经济管理—企业管理]