博弈视角下政府对建筑节能服务机构的监管效能分析  

Game of Government-Regulated Building Energy Efficiency Service from the Perspective of Efficiency

作　　者：邓建英[1] 兰秋军[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《系统工程》2015年第12期96-100,共5页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：在推行建筑节能政策进程中,建筑节能服务机构通过实施合同能源管理项目,为建筑节能相关方提供节能服务,获取回报利润;政府制定并实施激励政策,激励建筑节能服务机构推广建筑节能项目,推动短期利益和长期利益协调发展,实现监管效能目标。建筑节能服务机构可能接受政府的激励约束管理,也可能不接受,由此产生政府与建筑节能服务机构间的博弈关系,在分析的基础上,建立激励约束模型,由混合战略均衡、聚点均衡、逆向选择分析求解,研究监管效能的帕累托最优改进,并依据均衡结果进行经济解释,得出结论。In the process of implementing the building energy efficiency polices, building energy efficiency service companies provide the related parties of building energy efficiency with their services through energy performance contracting, and then get their return. The government formulates and provides incentives of policies to motivate building energy efficiency service providers to popularize their service projects and promotes the coordinated development of the short-term and the long-term interests, and achieves regulatory effectiveness. Building energyefficiency service companies may and may not accept the government＇s motivational management,hence a gaming relationship between the government and the building energy efficiency service companies. On the basis of an analysis of the gaming relationship, this paper constructs a motivation and constraint model, solves with the hybrid strategy equilibrium, or accumulation equilibrium, or adverse selecting analysis, research on supervision efficiency of Pareto optimal improvement, and makes economic explanations to the equilibrium.

关 键 词：能源系统工程 监管效能 激励约束模型 均衡分析求解 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]