机构地区:[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433 [2]复旦大学古籍整理研究所,上海200433
出 处:《复旦学报(社会科学版)》2016年第1期76-85,共10页Fudan Journal(Social Sciences)
基 金:2012年国家社科基金项目(项目批准号:12BZX062);2012年上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(项目批准号:2012EZX001);2013年国家社科基金青年项目(项目批准号:13CZJ012)系列成果之一
摘 要:同品(sapaksa)、异品(vipaksa)和宗有法(paksa)是陈那因明的初始概念。以"声是无常"宗为例,宗有法即这里宗命题的主项"声",是辩论双方尚未共许是否无常的对象;同品是辩论双方已经共许为无常的对象,即除了主项"声"以外无常的事物,如"瓶"、"电"等;异品是双方已经共许为常的对象,即除了主项"声"以外恒常的事物,如"虚空"、"极微"等。同、异品除宗有法即宗有法(如这里的"声")被排除在同品和异品的外延范围之外。同品、异品和宗有法三者各别,是陈那对于推论所涉及的论域全集最初的三分(tripartitionism),是陈那因明的一项体系性规定。在除宗以外的同、异品范围中,即双方未发生意见分歧的对象范围中,考察逻辑理由(因)与立论方所要论证在"声"上出现的属性"无常"之间的逻辑联系,用双方共许的证据来论证对方不承认的主张,是陈那因明论辩逻辑的核心思想,体现了陈那因明非演绎、非单调的逻辑特征。沈海燕教授对于因明原典断章取义,以附会传统的陈那因明归纳演绎合一说,错失了决定陈那因明逻辑性质的关键所在。她强调本体论上常与无常之间非此即彼的关系,默认声本来就是无常,将一己之见强加给古印度论辩的双方,这都脱离了陈那因明的论辩逻辑特征。本文依据因明原典,征引国际最新研究成果,结合逻辑学基础知识,与之进行商榷。Paksaipak sa are three basic concepts in Dignāga's logic. The universe of discourse is,sapak sa and vdivided into three parts,i. e. paksaa and vipaksa epistemic attitudes of both the proponent,sapaks,according to theand the opponent. In the case of the thesis "sound is non-eternal,"the sound is paksa,i. e. the subject-in-dispute,which cannot be accepted by both sides in debate to be eternal or non-eternal; sapaksasimilar instance,i. e.,includes things which are accepted by both to be non-eternal; and vipaksae. dissimilar instancethings which are,i.,includes accepted by both to be eternal. The tripartitionism of paksasapaksa and vipaksa is key feature of Dignāga's logic. It,shows us the dialectic approach of Dignāga's logical theorization,and from it we know the non-deductiveness and nonmonotonicity of Dignāga's logic. This is also a key clue to understand the uniqueness of Dignāga in the history of Indian logic. Recently,Prof. Shen Haiyan published an article to deny the logical significance of the tripartitionism in Dignāga's logic. From her viewpoint,the exclusion of pak sa from sapak sa a technique for,on one hand,is onlysearching out appropriate examples to illustrate the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya,while paksa is actuallyincluded in sapaksa because sound is in fact non-eternal. On the other hand,paksa cannot be included in vipaksa invirtue of the same fact that sound is non-eternal.Therefore,the stipulation of excluding paksa from vipaksa is redundant. In her viewāga's logic is not only,Digndeductive but also inductive. The present paper,based on the contemporary international scholarship on this topic,carries out a close reading of relevant passages from Dignāga and his Chinese commentators with an appreciation of methods of modern logic,resulting in the conclusion that Prof. Shen has unfortunately missed the dialectic feature of Dignāga's logic. Her interpretation of Dignāga's words is problematic. She emphasizes the fact that ontologically speaking,an individ
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