我国食品安全监管者的信息瞒报与合谋现象分析——基于委托代理模型的解释与实践验证  

Information Concealing and Conspiring Problems of Food Safety Regulators in China:Interpretation Based on Principal-agent Model and Its Practical Verification

作　　者：全世文[1] 曾寅初[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所,北京100732 [2]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院,北京100872

出　　处：《管理评论》2016年第2期210-218,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71141026)

摘　　要：本文根据委托代理理论构建了一个消费者委托监管者对食品进行抽样检测并汇报食品安全信息的模型,指出了我国现行食品安全监管体制中的"结果考核制"和"检测权与处罚权合一"两种制度安排存在严重的激励扭曲,会导致监管者不作为、瞒报食品安全信息,甚至与生产者合谋。本文进一步结合食品安全实践中监管责任的典型案例,对分析结论进行了验证。在此基础上,本文对改进食品安全监管机制提出了政策建议。According to principal-agent theory, we construct a model where consumers entrust food safety regulators to make sampling inspection and report food safety information to consumers. Our results show two existing institutional arrangements in China＇ s food safety regulation are improper and regulators ＇ incentives might be strongly distorted. The first arrangement is ＇ result-based-assessment＇ , where regulators＇ performance are evaluated by the true level of food safety, and the second is supervision monopoly, namely the power of in- spection and the power of punishment on producers are centralized in the hand of regulators. Representative cases with regard to regula- tion responsibility in food safety incidents partly confirm the deduction. And correspondingly, we propose several suggestions on ensuring incentive compatibility of food safety regulators.

关 键 词：食品安全 监管机制 激励相容 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] D922.16[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]