基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析  

Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets

作　　者：曲国华[1] 张汉鹏[2] 刘增良[1] 徐岭[3] 张振华[4] 张强[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]西南财经大学工商管理学院,四川成都610074 [3]北京石油化工学院经济管理学院,北京102600 [4]广东外语外贸大学经济贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2015年第12期53-62,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：广东省软科学项目(2015A070704051);广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030313575);广东省哲学社科十二五规划项目(GD12XGL14);广东省教育厅科技创新项目(2013KJCX0072);广州市哲学社科十二五规划项目(14G41)

摘　　要：由于金融市场存在信息不对称使得投资决策者缺乏必要的环境信息,从而导致了投资决策信息不完全、金融资金分配不合理等问题。本文在Nikolaou,Chymis和Evangelinos[5]提出的环境信息、金融市场不对称博弈模型的基础上,引入政府局中人行为策略,构建了政府、企业与金融市场之间的博弈模型。通过设置相关参数发现,该博弈模型能够覆盖Nikolaou,Chymis和Evangelinos[5]提出的模型,并证明了在政府局中人参与并满足一定条件的情况下,由环境信息缺失引起的信息不对称问题可以通过引入第三方国际环境审计来解决,从而为我国环境污染问题的化解机制提供新的研究角度。Due to a lack of essential environmental information, asymmetric information can lead to some problems such as incomplete information for investment decisions and misallocation of financial markets funds in financial markets. Another game model which include three players, government, financial markets and firm is developed by incorporating government moves based on the game model of Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos financial markets, environmental information asymmetry. By setting the relevant parameters, it is revealed that Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos model could be covered by above mentioned game model and proved, under the conditions for participation in the government＇s case, that asymmetric information problem due to the lack of accurate environmental information can be solved by introducing third-party international environmental audit, so as to providing a new research angle for China＇s environmental problem resolution mechanism.

关 键 词：信息不对称 信号传递 金融机构 第三方国际环境审计 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]