信息不对称下制造商填塞分销渠道策略研究  

Manufacturer's Channel Stuffing Strategies under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：李建斌[1] 王启飞[1] 胡威[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]南开大学数学科学学院,天津300071

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2016年第1期8-14,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171088;70901029;71131004;71202162);中央高校基本科研业务专项基金(HUST:CXY12M013;2014YQ002;65011451);教育部新世纪优秀人才项目NCET-13-0228

摘　　要：由制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链,制造商管理者可能使用填塞分销渠道策略最大化自己的效用。本文研究在信息不对称的情形下,制造商填塞分销渠道决策对供应链绩效的影响。研究发现:随着修正财务报告的投资者增多,制造商的库存水平以及制造商管理者的效用都会降低;而随着制造商管理者对市场价值重视程度提高,制造商的利润降低,这表明填塞分销渠道对制造商的真实价值产生负面影响。同时,供应链的利润不仅与管理者填塞分销决策有关,还受到零售价格等外在因素的影响。进一步地,加强外部监管以及设计合理的激励制度,有助于减少管理者填塞分销渠道的行为。In a two-stage supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, the manutacturer manager may maximize his own utility through channel stuffing strategy. This paper investigates the effect of channel stuffing decisions on the supply chain performance under information asymmetry and finds that as the investors correcting finical reports increase, the inventory level as well as the manufacturer manager＇ s utility decrease. When the manager pays more attention to market value, the manufacturer＇ s profit decreases which indicates channel stuff- ing has a negative effect on the manufacturer＇ s real value. Meanwhile, the profit of the total supply chain is affected by the manager＇ s channel stuffing decision as well as other external factors such as retail price. Moreo- ver, strengthening external supervision and designing a reasonable incentive scheme help to reduce managers＇ channel stuffing behaviors.

关 键 词：供应链绩效 填塞分销渠道 信息不对称 经理人股票期权 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]