随机需求下竞争零售商的定价策略研究  

Competitive Retailers' Pricing Strategy under Stochastic Demand

作　　者：高晓敏[1] 刘志学[1] 左晓露[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2016年第1期133-144,共12页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372134)

摘　　要：本文研究了随机需求下两竞争零售商的定价策略选择(响应性定价或清仓定价)、产品订货量及响应性价格的联合决策问题。通过将问题转化为一个三阶段的博弈模型,基于Kuhn-Tucker条件求解了两零售商不同定价策略子博弈下的均衡产品订货量及响应性定价决策,分析了不同定价策略子博弈下产品订货量及价格决策的差别以及潜在市场需求不确定(期望和方差变动)对订货量和定价策略的影响。数值分析结果表明,当潜在市场需求服从均匀分布时,响应性定价子博弈是帕累托最优策略,清仓定价子博弈是零售商的均衡策略,混合定价子博弈下两零售商的收益差距较大。This paper studies a joint pricing policy （ responsive pricing or market clearance pricing） , product order quantity and responsive pricing decision for two competitive retailers under a stochastic demand environ- ment. By developing a three-stage game model, based on the Kuhn-Tucker condition, two retailers＇ equilibrium order quantity and responsive pricing decisions under different pricing subgames are obtained, the differences of the order quantity and responsive pricing decisions of the four pricing subgames are analyzed, and the impact of demand uncertainty on order quantity and pricing policy are investigated as well The numerical analysis shows that, when the potential market demand is uniformly distributed, responsive pricing subgame will be Pareto optimal, however, market clearance pricing subgame is the equilibrium pricing strategy of the retailers, and there is a huge income gap between the retailers under the mixed pricing subgame.

关 键 词：响应性定价 随机需求 清仓定价 博弈分析 均衡策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]