论能力与新能力假说  

The Ability and the New Ability Hypothesis

作　　者：何冬玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2016年第2期41-47,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：知识论证试图证明非物理的现象事实的存在,但是物理主义者给出的答案——能力以及能力假说——瓦解了知识论证的企图。然而,能力到底是什么?能力仅仅是关于如何的实践知识吗?这是物理主义者和能力假说的捍卫者必须要回答的问题,文章通过对能力的分析和定义对以上问题给出合理的答案,并且通过定义能力进一步对能力假说给出全新的诠释。同时,以能力的新定义为基础的新能力假说会具有更加稳固的物理主义基础,这样才能对知识论证的反驳给出有力的回击。The knowledge argument wants to prove that there are non-physically phenomenal facts, but the physicalist＇s answer--the Ability and the Ability Hypothesis--breaks up the attempt of the knowledge argument. However, what is the Ability？ Is the Ability only about knowledge-how？ These are the questions that the physicalists and the defenders of the Ability Hypothesis must answer. This article gives the reasonable answer through the analysis and definition of the Ability, and we can further more have a new interpretation about the Aability Hypothesis through the definition of the ability. At the same time, the new Ability Hypothesis which has the new definition of the ability will have a more stable physical foundation, and can fight back hard to the knowledge argument.

关 键 词：现象事实 能力 知识论证 能力假说 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]