基于微分对策的政企合作低碳策略  

Low-carbon Cooperative Strategy between Government and Enterprise Based on Differential Games

作　　者：赵黎明[1] 陈喆芝[1] 刘嘉玥 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第1期84-90,共7页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：基于区域低碳发展评估构想,建立成本补贴制度下的政企互动动态微分博弈模型,探求激发地方政府与企业热情的符合中国国情低碳发展机制。模型求解表明:地方政府为企业提供一定成本补贴的政企低碳合作制度有助于地区低碳经济发展,对应的Stackelberg主从博弈均衡优于双方单独开展低碳工作的Nash非合作博弈;在相同的地方政府低碳努力轨迹下,政企合作能够推动企业更大程度地投入低碳经营,区域低碳效益得到显著提升。In the trend of global warming,international community achieved relevant cooperation frameworks to cope with climate change.China is actively undertaking emission reduction commitments,paying high attention to low-carbon economy.Based on the conception of regional low-carbon development assessment,a dynamic differential game model with cost allowance is established to explore the sustainable development mechanism suitable for China＇s national conditions,with the view of stimulating the enthusiasm of local government and enterprise.Model solution indicate that low-carbon cooperative strategy between government and enterprise is conducive to regional low-carbon economy,corresponding Stackelberg game equilibrium is superior to Nash non-cooperation game equilibrium;with the same track of local government＇s low-carbon efforts,the cooperation is helpful to promote enterprise more engaged in low-carbon,and enhance the development results.

关 键 词：低碳经济 政企合作 碳排放 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]