融资约束与民营企业税务自利行为研究  

Research between Financing Constraints and Corporate Tax Self-interest in Private Enterprise

作　　者：张琛[1] 刘银国[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601 [2]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《经济管理》2016年第3期113-123,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"国有企业自由现金流量优化与控制机制研究"(71172190);国家自然科学基金项目"国有企业多元治理逻辑;董事会行为合法性与企业可持续成长"(71572001)

摘　　要：本文使用2010—2014年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据,基于委托代理理论研究了民营企业的税务自利行为,并进一步考察融资约束对企业税务自利行为的影响。结果显示,相对于非民营企业,民营企业存在着更为激进的税务自利行为;在融资约束条件下,民营企业的税务自利行为更加严重。民营企业潜在的融资约束促使它们从事积极的税务自利行为以节省相关税费支出,从而为公司的未来投资储备更多现金流。From tax reform in 1994, China＇s tax revenue has been showing a trend of rapid growth, and the growth rate of total tax revenue has climbed to new heights. Especially for the private enterprise, it is in the increas- ingly important contribution to the taxation, and even plays the leading role in some provinces. China＇s financial de- velopment significantly enhanced the company＇s income tax, and mainly in private enterprises. Statistics shows that private enterprise＇s contribution to GDP taxation has exceeded 50%. Under the background of accounting standards convergence and the tax burden, tax self-interest behavior of some private enterprises are starting to become active, they expect to avoid tax reasonable and reduce the burden. Research on this issue has significance as following aspects. First, in the context of financial crisis, China＇s private enterprises has the problem of difficulties in financing, so they have positive motivation to tax self-interest and to save the fees. So that they could invest the limited funds into the opportunities with more profitable. This study helps to understand how the private enterprises do the tax self-interest, so as to provide reference for decision- makers in the formulation of economic decision-making. Second, compared to the state-owned enterprises, private enterprises are facing more severe agency problem between major shareholder and minority shareholders. Numerous studies show that the major shareholder obtains excess returns at the expense of minority shareholders, while minori- ty shareholders often protect themselves only by the way ＂vote with their feet＂. In the process of enterprise tax self- interest, the maj management. Thi or shareholder may get specific ＂ implicit rents＂ by using related party transactions and earnings s study will help us understand the agent problem between major shareholder and minority share- holders from the perspective of tax self-interest. Third, there is no literature at home and abroad study the company＇s tax s

关 键 词：民营企业 税务自利 融资约束 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]