论《庄子》中的行为对象道德相对论  

Patient Moral Relativism in the Zhuangzi

作　　者：黄勇[1] 崔雅琴 

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学哲学系 [2]华东政法大学校报

出　　处：《社会科学》2016年第3期115-124,共10页Journal of Social Sciences

摘　　要：笔者以前曾根据《庄子》提出道德铜律和差异伦理学。但是,人们很容易批评说,这种庄子式伦理学是一种道德相对论,而道德相对论,至少就我们所知道的形式而言是成问题的、危险的,甚至会引向道德的反面。虽然庄子是道德相对论者,但他不是那种常见的以行为主体为中心或以评判者为中心的道德相对论者,而是一种未见于西方哲学传统的全新类型的道德相对论者,即以行为对象为中心的道德相对论,它可以避免西方哲学传统中发展出来的道德相对论的问题。Whether in the name of copper rule or that of ethics of difference, the Zhuangzian ethics that I have developed in the previous articles is liable to the charge of moral relativism, which, at least in the forms known to us, is problematic, dangerous, and even self-defeating. In this paper, after arguing why Zhuangzi is not a moral skeptic as is often claimed, I provide some further support for my interpretation of the Zhuangzi as presenting a patient centered relativism, which is not inflicted with the obvious problems associated with any familiar type of moral relativism, either the agent-centered or the appraiser-centered.

关 键 词：《庄子》 道德相对论 行为对象道德相对论 怀疑论 

分 类 号：B223.5[哲学宗教—中国哲学]