股权至上、债权至上:银行持股能解决利益冲突吗  

Shareholder Primacy,Priority of Creditors: Can Bank holding Share in Company Resolve the Conflicts of Interest between Creditors and Shareholder

作　　者：罗付岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林理工大学管理学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《财贸研究》2016年第1期142-150,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"银行关联;企业并购决策与并购绩效"(71562007);"基于复杂适应系统理论农业科技资源配置结构效应及优化的计算实验研究"(71463011);广西自然科学基金项目"非对称随机波动模型杠杆效应的非参数估计及其在金融衍生证劵中的应用"(2014GXNSFAA118015)

摘　　要：从并购的视角考察银行持股(银行持有企业股权)和股权债权合一(银行持股且贷款给同一公司)能否解决银行与企业之间的代理冲突。首先,分析银行持股和股权债权合一的两种竞争性观点——鉴证效应和利益冲突效应;然后,使用中国A股2006—2012年上市公司银行持股和股权债权合一数据实证检验它们对股东并购财富的影响。结果发现,银行持股和股权债权合一显著地减少了企业股东的并购财富。研究结论支持银行债权人与股东之间的利益冲突假设,利益冲突会导致价值破坏型并购投资。The paper examines whether bank holding share in company and dual of creditors and shareholder relieve agency conflict between creditors and shareholders from the views of mergers and acquisitions. Firstly,the two competing views of bank holding share and dual of creditors and shareholder,certification and conflict of interest effect,are analyzed from the theory views. Then,the relationship between the dual of creditors and shareholder and wealth effect of merger are tested using data during 2006- 2012 of A share in China. Empirical results showthat bank holding share in company and dual of creditors and shareholder significantly reduces the acquisition wealth of shareholders. These results support the assumption of the interest conflict between the bank creditors and shareholders,which lead to the destructing value M A.Conclusions of this paper has an important value for the reform of the relationship banks and guiding the practice of mergers and acquisitions.

关 键 词：银行持股 股权债权合一 并购 利益冲突 事件研究 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]