基于双主体博弈的地方政府任期对区域环境合作稳定性影响研究  

Study on the Impact of Government Term on Regional Environmental Cooperation Stability Based on Game Theory

作　　者：李明全[1] 王奇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学环境科学与工程学院,北京100871

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2016年第3期83-88,共6页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国地区间经济关联的隐含大气污染转移及补偿机制研究:基于多地区投入产出分析"(编号:41471465)

摘　　要：区域内地方政府合作是解决跨界环境污染的重要途径,我国现行环境管理体制决定了任期长短对地方政府是否环境合作具有重要影响。基于博弈论分析方法,针对地方政府任期对区域环境合作的稳定性影响进行了理论分析。首先,分析了完全信息静态博弈时两个地方政府非合作与合作情形下的均衡污染排放量,构建基于无限次重复博弈模型并讨论两个地方政府采取冷酷战略时彼此合作的临界贴现因子。然后,基于有限次重复博弈模型讨论了临界贴现因子与任期长短的关系。研究发现,贴现因子高于临界水平是地方政府选择环境合作的必要条件;而地方政府的任期越长则临界贴现因子越小,地方政府之间环境合作稳定性越强。基于此,提出了地方政府任期及环境保护终身追责等促进区域环境合作的建议。The cooperation among local governments is an important way to solve the trans-boundary pollution problem which trnubles China seriously. The current Chinese environmental management system determines that the tenure of local government has important implications for environmental cooperation. This study theoretically analyzes the relationship between the govermnent term and the stability of regional environmental cooperation based on game theory. First, the equilibrium amounts of pollutant emission are analyzed based on two complete information static game models in cases of regional cooperation and noncooperation separately. And then, the critical discount factor of regional environmental cooperation is discussed based on infinitely repeated dynamic game with regions taking the grim strategy. Furthermore, the relationship between critical discount factor of regional enviromnental c^peration and government term is researched based on the finitely repeated game model. It shows that, discount factor above the critical level is the necessary requirement for regional environmental cooperation. The longer the term of government is, the smaller the critical discount factor of regional enviromnental cooperation is, and the greater the likelihood of regional environmental cooperation is. Based on this, we put forward some suggestions to promote regional environmental cooperation about the tenure of local government and lifehmg responsibility of environmental protection.

关 键 词：地方政府 任期 环境合作 重复博弈 

分 类 号：X22[环境科学与工程—环境科学]