基于演化博弈的食品安全监管研究  

Study on food safety supervision based on evolutionary game theory

作　　者：雷勋平[1,2] 邱广华[1] 唐润[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016 [2]铜陵学院工商管理学院,安徽铜陵244000 [3]南京财经大学,南京210013

出　　处：《黑龙江畜牧兽医（下半月）》2016年第1期9-13,共5页

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CGL125);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC630082);江苏省高校自然科学基金面上项目(13KJB550012)

摘　　要：笔者运用演化博弈方法,针对食品安全监管过程,建立食品安全监管博弈模型,并通过复制动态方程的动态趋势和稳定性分析,揭示食品安全监管部门和食品提供企业策略选择的互动行为及其稳定状态。结果表明:加大对食品提供企业的监管力度和惩罚力度,增强食品提供企业的社会责任意识,能够促使食品安全监管部门和食品提供企业良性互动,达到演化稳定均衡(ESS),最终实现帕累托最优,共同确保食品安全。The author uses a method of evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of food safety supervision aiming at the food supervision process,and also reveals the interactive behavior and stable state of different strategy selection from supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food through analyzing dynamic trend and stability of replicator dynamics equation. The results show that increasing the supervision,punishment and social responsibility for the enterprises providing food and strengthening the awareness of social responsibility of the enterprises providing food,can promote the benign interaction between the supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food to achieve the evolutionary stable strategy（ ESS）. Finally,Pareto optimality can be realized to jointly ensure food safety.

关 键 词：演化博弈 食品安全 监管 复制动态方程 策略选择 

分 类 号：S872[农业科学—畜牧兽医] S879.1