意识及其意向体验的现象学澄清  

Clarification of Consciousness and Its Intentional Experience in Phenomenology

作　　者：李朝东[1] 董春莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学哲学与政治学研究院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第1期62-67,共6页Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）

基　　金：甘肃省"经典诠释研究"项目;甘肃省哲学重点学科建设经费资助

摘　　要："意识"是现象学的中心课题和核心概念,胡塞尔现象学中,"意识"概念有"作为自我之现象学组成的意识"和"作为内感知的意识"两个最基本的含义,前者作为意向体验具有构造对象的功能,后者作为"内意识"或"自身意识"不具有构造对象的功能,但却是构成意识体验之统一的前提。本文通过对意识作为自我体验的实项、内意识作为内感知和意识作为意向体验的分析,试图对意识及其意向体验进行现象学的澄清。＂Consciousness＂ is the core concept of phenomenology.In Husserl＇s phenomenology,the concept of ＂consciousness＂ is mainly composed of ＂consciousness as self-constituting phenomenology＂ and ＂consciousness as internal perception＂.The former as intentional experience has the ability of constituting objects,while the latter as internal consciousness or self consciousness does not have such ability-although it is the premise for the unity of consciousness and experience.By taking awareness as entity of self experience and internal awareness as the internal experience of inner perception and consciousness,this paper sets out to clarify consciousness and its intentional experience in phenomenology

关 键 词：意识 意向体验 感觉材料 意向相关项 内意识 意向内容 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]