人格的观念与政治自由主义的证成  

Rawls' Conceptions of Personality and His Justification of Political Liberalism

作　　者：惠春寿[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学系,博士生杭州310028

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2016年第3期56-61,157,共6页Zhejiang Social Sciences

摘　　要：为了回应社群主义者对公平的正义依赖于康德式的人类道德本质的批评,罗尔斯对他自由平等人的观念进行了修正,主张它只是一种对所有宗教、哲学学说均不持立场的,关于公民的学说。这种修正引发了正义原则证成方法的转变——契约的方法变成了政治建构主义的方法,对正义稳定性的契合论证也变成了重叠共识的理念。但不论是在政治建构主义中,还是在重叠共识中,自由平等人的观念都发挥着根本的作用,罗尔斯政治自由主义的转向因此不但是被这种观念所引起的,而且也是依赖于这种观念得以完成的。Some communitarians believe Rawls' theory of justice was based on the Kantian conception of human nature, which is a fatal flaw. In order to response this criticism, Rawls revises his conception of personality, and claims it is a political conception of citizen and is freestanding among all philosophical doctrines. This revision activates the regeneration of the justification to the principle of justice, more specifically, now the social contract is displaced by political constructivism, and the stability of justice doesn't rely upon the congruence argument but the ideal of overlapping consensus. However, the conception of free and equal person still plays a fundamental role in both political constructivism and overlapping consensus. Rawls' political turn thus is not only involved by his conception of personality, but also accomplished in virtue of his conception of personality.

关 键 词：政治自由主义 自由平等人 社群主义 政治建构主义 重叠共识 

分 类 号：D091[政治法律—政治学]