生命周期视角下终极控股股东与企业技术创新投资  

Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and Technological Innovation Investment Perspective of Corporate Life Cycle

作　　者：程仲鸣[1] 张鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]温州大学商学院,浙江温州325035

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第3期15-20,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL036);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(13YJA630013);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY14G020008)

摘　　要：以股东代理理论为基础,基于生命周期视角分析终极控股股东的两权偏离对企业技术创新投资的影响,并以2007~2014年我国上市公司为样本进行实证检验。研究发现,在整个生命周期,终极控股股东的两权偏离程度越大,企业技术创新投资越少;在生命周期不同阶段,两权偏离的影响存在较大差异。在成长期,两权偏离对企业的技术创新投资有支持效应;在衰退期,两权偏离对企业的技术创新投资有抑制效应;在成熟期,仅有微弱证据表明两权偏离与企业技术创新投资呈负相关关系。两权偏离对处于生命周期不同阶段的企业技术创新影响主要来自于非垄断行业。Based on agency theory of controlling shareholders,the paper investigates the effect of the separation of control power and cash-flow right on technological innovation investment,and empirically analyzes the relationship by using the data on Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2014. Results show that,as for ultimate controlling shareholders,the higher the separation two rights is,the less is the technological innovation investment throughout corporate life cycle. However,the findings show that there is a significant positive correlation between the separation of two rights and innovation investment in growth phase of life-cycles,a significantly negative correlation in decline phase,but an insignificantly negative correlation in maturity phase.

关 键 词：两权偏离 生命周期 技术创新投资 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济]