Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures  

作　　者：WANG Lei GAO HongWei PETROSYAN Leon QIAO Han SEDAKOV Artem 

机构地区：[1]School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China [2]institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao 266071, China [3]Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg 198504, Russia [4]School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China

出　　处：《Science China Mathematics》2016年第5期1015-1028,共14页中国科学：数学（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71171120;71373262 and 71571108);Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215);Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002);Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007);Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)

摘　　要：The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.

关 键 词：cooperative game theory coalition structure strategic stability imputation distribution procedure deviation instant ε-Nash equilibrium strong ε-Nash equilibrium 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]