政府干预、产权性质与现金股利决策——基于地方财政压力与金字塔层级的检验  

Government Intervention,Property Rights and Cash Dividend Decisions——An Examination Based on Local Fiscal Stress and Pyramid Layer

作　　者：韩雪[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2016年第4期87-100,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272100)

摘　　要：以我国2009-2013年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了产权性质对上市公司现金分红决策的影响,并从地方财政压力和企业金字塔层级两个维度检验了政府干预动机、干预便利程度对不同产权上市公司现金分红影响的截面差异。研究发现:相比于民营上市公司,国有上市公司倾向于派发更少的现金股利;地方财政压力越大,国有上市公司相比民营上市公司派发的现金股利越少;金字塔层级越低,国有上市公司相比民营上市公司派发的现金股利越少。Using the samples of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2013, this paper empirically investigates the relation- ship between property fight and cash dividend decisions. Using local fiscal pressure and pyramid layer indicators, we further test the impact of tunneling motivation and tunneling convenience on cash dividend allocation behavior. The results show that, compared with private companies, state owned companies tend to allocate fewer cash dividends. Furthermore, higher local fiscal pressure widens the cash dividend gap between private companies and state controlled companies, while higher pyramid layers close the cash dividend gap between private companies and state controlled companies.

关 键 词：现金股利 产权性质 地方政府财政压力 金字塔层级 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]