管理者权力、股权激励与盈余管理——基于倾向评分匹配法和双重差分法的分析  

Managerial Power, Equity Incentive and Earning Management——The Analysis Based on Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-difference Approaches

作　　者：张东旭[1] 张姗姗[1] 董小红[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]安徽财经大学商学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2016年第4期114-124,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CGL017);财政部会计名家培养工程(财会[2015]14号);安徽省自然科学基金项目(1308085MG113)

摘　　要：使用倾向评分匹配法和双重差分法分析了股权激励对于企业盈余管理程度的影响,同时考察了管理者权力大小对两者关系的影响。研究发现:与控制组相比,测试组在股权激励前一年及股权激励后存在更少的盈余管理行为,从而支持了最优契约假说;考虑管理者权力因素后,在管理者权力较大组中,测试组与控制组之间的盈余管理水平没有显著差异,这与管理者权力假说的预期一致,而在管理者权力较小组中,最优契约假说依然成立。以上研究结论对于《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(征求意见稿)的修订具有一定的启发意义。The negative effect of equity incentive has always been of great concern of theorists and practitioners. By using propensity score matching and difference-in-difference approaches, we analyzed the influence of equity incentive on the level of earnings management. In the meantime, we also examined whether the power of management could affect the relation between equity incentive and earnings management. Compared to control group, we found less earnings management in the treatment group in the previous year of equity incentive vesting date and years after vesting date, which supported the optimal contract hypothesis. Taking managerial power into consideration, there was no significant difference between the earnings management level of treatment group and control group in the ca^e of larger managerial power. However, the optimal contract hypothesis was still valid in the case of smaller managerial power. The findings of our paper could provide some instructive suggestion for the revision of 〈Regulations of Listed Companies＇ Equity Incentive〉（Draft）.

关 键 词：股权激励 盈余管理 管理者权力 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]