基于解雇威胁的多期国企经理激励模型研究  

A Muli-stage Incentive Model of SOE Managers Based on Dismissal Threat

作　　者：刘鸿雁[1] 尹伊娜 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济管理系,河北保定071000

出　　处：《科技和产业》2016年第4期94-98,共5页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJA630053)

摘　　要：制定约束与激励并存的薪酬制度能有效引导经理人的决策行为,对提高国有企业竞争力有着重要意义。传统委托代理模型只有正向激励,在此基础上,增加解雇威胁这个负向激励,重新建立两个阶段的激励新模型,并求解。研究结果表明:与原来只存在业绩分享激励单阶段模型而言,增加解雇威胁会使得经理在第一期付出更多的努力;第一期业绩分享比例激励的大小与解雇威胁这个负向激励的大小呈正相关等结论。Developing a salary system which both have constraints and incentives can effectively guide the manager＇s decision-making,so as to improve the competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.Traditional agency model only owns positive incentives.On this basis,we increased a negative incentive named threat of dismissal to re-establish a new two-stage model.The results found that：in the new model,managers may give more effort.Besides,the bigger the dismissal threat is,the higher the first part of the performance incentive share ratio will be.

关 键 词：委托代理 经理激励 国有企业 解雇威胁 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]