薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵  

Pay Bandwagon, Earnings Management and Executives' Compensation Manipulation

作　　者：罗宏[1] 曾永良[2] 宛玲羽 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院 [2]西南财经大学 [3]徽商银行

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2016年第2期19-31,74,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(14XJA630002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(JBK160917)资助

摘　　要：本文研究攀比的心理特征对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,如果高管薪酬低于同行业可比公司高管薪酬中位数越多,高管进行薪酬攀比的动机越大,其在未来通过盈余管理操纵薪酬的程度增加,并且相比于应计盈余管理,高管更可能通过真实盈余管理操纵薪酬,而这种效应在公司高管团队内部薪酬差距较大时得以缓解。进一步看,当公司属于竞争性行业或所处行业景气度较低时,薪酬攀比加剧了高管的薪酬操纵行为,即行业特征会对薪酬攀比与薪酬操纵之间的关系产生调节效应。研究还发现,薪酬攀比对企业未来价值创造的确具有负面效应。上述证据表明,攀比心理是高管实施薪酬操纵的重要诱因,意味着研究高管薪酬激励时,应关注高管对待薪酬的主观心理感受和心理预期。In this article, we study the impact of the psychological characteristics of comparison on executives’ compensation contract. We apply the ratio of executive pay and the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, namely the comparison coefficient, as an alternative variable of executive pay bandwagon, and earnings management as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon, to examine whether executives in the listed company of China have comparing mentality. After controlling the firm characteristics, management characteristics and external environment factors, we find that the lower the executives’ compensation was than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry the previous year（the smaller the comparing coefficient）, the stronger incentive the executives to compare with other executives whose pay is higher, increasing the extent to which executives manipulate compensation through earnings management the following year, and executives tend to manipulate compensation via real earnings management rather than accrual earnings management. This effect is mitigated when the pay gap between executives in the same firm was high last year, as the executives might choose to change their referents, that is, to seek larger executive pay gap within their team to alleviate the unfair awareness caused by pay bandwagon. Furthermore, we find that when the firm is in a non-monopoly industry or the industry is slumping, pay bandwagon exacerbates executives’ compensation manipulation operated by real earnings management. Yet when the industry which the firm belongs to is monopoly industry or the industry is experiencing a boom, pay bandwagon did not significantly exacerbate executive compensation manipulation, i.e., industry characteristics have moderating effects on the relation between pay bandwagon and compensation manipulation. Finally, we also find that pay bandwagon has significantly negative effects on firms’ future value-creating, as rigging compensatio

关 键 词：攀比心理 真实盈余管理 应计盈余管理 薪酬操纵 行业特征 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]