基于前景理论的食品行业行为监管演化博弈分析  被引量:26

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavior Supervision of Food Industry Based on Prospect Theory

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作  者:雷勋平[1,2] 邱广华[1] 

机构地区:[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]铜陵学院工商管理学院,安徽铜陵244000

出  处:《系统工程》2016年第2期82-88,共7页Systems Engineering

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971064);国家社科基金青年项目(13CGL125);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(12YJC630082);高等教育振兴计划人才项目"安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划"(皖教秘人[2014]181号);铜陵学院2014年度校学术带头人及后备人选项目(2014tlxyxs33)

摘  要:基于前景理论,以前景价值函数表示演化博弈矩阵的收益函数,构建食品行业行为监管前景值矩阵,推理得出杜绝食品提供企业不诚信行为的条件,并引入政府补贴,进一步建立政府补贴条件下食品提供企业行为影响模型。研究结果表明:食品安全监管部门积极监管时,食品提供企业讲究诚信的成本前景值小于食品安全部门的处罚及不诚信收入的前景值之和,且也小于食品提供企业讲究诚信时所得到的外部收益;食品提供企业讲究诚信的成本付出、处罚力度、不诚信的收入等指标直接影响他们的行为选择;由于风险规避系数的不同,食品提供企业对食品安全风险的态度各不一样,政府补贴不能完全有效减少食品提供企业的不诚信行为,甚至形成负面影响;在政府补贴条件下,食品安全监管部门可以通过加大查处力度或增加处罚强度实施食品行业行为监管。Based on prospect theory, this paper uses prospect value function to show income function of evolutionary game matrix, in order to build the prospect value matrix of food industry's behavior supervision. So we get the conditions from reasons to avoid dishonest behavior of supplying food enterprises. This paper also introduces government subsidy for further constructing the food enterprises behavior influencing model under the subsidy. This study shows that under positive measures from the food safety supervision departments, when the food enterprises pay attention to honesty and trust, their cost of prospect value of honest enterprises is less than the sum of the food supervision penalty and dishonest income's prospect value, also less than the external income. As well, their cost, penalty and dishonest income will have direct influence on their behavior. Because of different risk aversion coefficient, the food enterprises will have different attitudes to food safety risk, so the enterprises' dishonest behaviors won't be reduced by government subsidy totally, which even will have negative effects on the enterprises. With government subsidy, the departments could strengthen supervision and intensify punishment to food industry behaviors.

关 键 词:前景理论 食品行业 行为监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F307[经济管理—产业经济] TS201[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]

 

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