从经验想象力到先验想象力——《纯粹理性批判》中想象力的先验改造与疑难  

From Empirical Imagination to Transcendental Imagination:The Problem of the Reconstruction of Imagination in Kritik der reinen Vernunft

作　　者：陆凯华[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2016年第3期61-68,160-161,共8页World Philosophy

摘　　要：《纯粹理性批判》中想象力的定位是康德学界的一大难题。本文认为,要解答这一问题,须重新思考两版《纯粹理性批判》中想象力概念的不同之处。康德在第一版对想象力的"主观演绎",实质是对亚里士多德经验想象力所进行的"先验"改造。第二版的改动则说明,康德意识到,从亚氏想象力推知出的先验想象力,仍缺少必要的先验规则。深入理解相关问题,则须内在地引入休谟想象力概念,以分析康德对先验想象力的推导中所存在的问题。本文认为,想象力的疑难在于康德未能区分经验想象力与先验想象力在综合规则上层次的差异。How to understand the position of imagination in Critique of Pure Reason has been one of most difficult problem among Kantian philosophers for years. In order to answer it,I think,it is necessary to reconsider the difference of concept of imagination between The First Edition and the Second Edition of the Critique. Kant's Subjective transcendental Deduction of imagination,has something to do with a sort of reconstruction of Aristotelian imagination. However,the revision of this part in the Second Edition of the Critique shows that Kant started to be aware of that there is no way to deduce the transcendentalimagination from the concept of Aristotelian imagination due to the lack of the rules. To make a clear picture,I will give an introduction of David Hume's argument on skeptical doubt by virtue of imagination. I think,the essence of this problem should be re-explored in term of the distinction between empirical imagination's and transcendental imagination's rules in accordance with which representations enter into imagination.

关 键 词：康德 纯粹理性批判 先验想象力 先验演绎 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]