检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819 [2]江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西南昌330013
出 处:《管理工程学报》2016年第2期133-141,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101024;71571038;71161013;71171042);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(N150602001)
摘 要:将行为金融理论引入基金投资者利益保护研究,构建基金销售市场中的行为委托代理模型,考察固定报酬激励方式和销售佣金激励方式下,基金管理公司与理财经理之间的双边道德风险问题,探究投资者利益受损的深层原因,揭示过度自信对投资者利益保护机制设计产生的影响。结果表明,基金管理公司与理财经理之间存在由双边道德风险问题引发的相互"搭便车"现象,双方的投入程度均与对方的投入程度呈反方向变动,与监管部门对对方的处罚力度亦呈反方向变动。并且,过度自信能够促使理财经理提高努力水平,监管部门对理财经理的处罚力度应随其过度自信程度的提高而降低,但同时为防范"搭便车"行为,应加大对基金管理公司的处罚力度,以保证对投资者所遭受的损失给予最大限度补偿。Open-end mutual funds have increased dramatically in China. How to protect the interests of fund investors effectively is an urgent issue for financial regulators to solve today. This paper focuses on fund investor protection based on double-side moral hazards in fund sale market and broker's overconfidence. In this paper, we combine the research of investor protection with behavioral finance theory, and set up a behavioral principal-agent model in fund sale market from the view of the supply side. In our analysis, we focus on the double-side moral hazard problem in fund sale market between fund management companies who develop products and an overconfident broker who sell products. The objective of this paper is to explore the underlying causes of fund investors' losses, and investigate the effect of brokers' overconfidence on the design of investor protection mechanism.The model that we analyze proceeds as follows. We take a fund management company who is responsible for developing financial products to be the principal, and an overconfident broker who is responsible for distributing the products to the public by providing advice to potential clients as the agent. The company has responsibility to provide good quality opportunities for fund investors, and higher quality to increase the probability that investors can benefit from making a purchase. The broker's job is to sort consumers and make recommendations based on a noisy signal about their type. In the condition of information asymmetry, how the company and biased broker fulfill their responsibilities is unobservable. Market participants face coordination problems that arise in settings with double-sided moral hazards. The authorities set a regulation that holds the company and the broker responsible when an investor does not make a right investment decision. This may happen if an investor incorrectly purchases inappropriate products. In our model, the penalty that the regulation dictates is set optimally based on the incentives that the company an
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.28