食品企业败德行为选择及博弈分析  

作　　者：黄毓雯 

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学经济学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《对外经贸》2016年第4期118-121,共4页FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS & TRADE

摘　　要：通过建立创新提高生产率、实施败德行为、不改进生产方式三种策略的寡头博弈市场模型,对食品企业的行为选择进行实证分析,并得出结论:当监管不力时,企业败德行为收益更高,并对具有规模优势和创新优势的企业产生挤出效应;当监管部门加大惩处力度时,将鼓励优势企业带动其他企业进行创新。提出以下对策建议:加大政府监管力度,打造自主知识产权创新项目,提高企业核心竞争力,充分发挥媒体、网络的舆论监督作用。Through three kinds of strategies of oligopoly market model： establishment of innovation to improve productivity, im- plementation of immoral hazard and not improving the production mode, we make empirical analysis of the behavior of food en- terprises selection, and draws the conclusions as follows： when regulatory is poor, enterprise gains more. with moral hazard, and has a crowding out effect on the enterprises which have advantages of scale and innovation; when the supervision depart- ments increase the intensity of punishment, it will encourage superior enterprises to lead innovation in other enterprises. We put forward the following suggestions： strengthen the supervision from the government, build the independent intellectual property rights innovation project, improve the core competitiveness of enterprises and play an important role of supervision by public o- pinion from the media and network.

关 键 词：食品企业 败德行为 政府管制 寡头博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]