惩罚机制下供应链企业碳减排投入的演化博弈  

Evolutionary game of carbon-emission-reduction investment in supply chains under a contract with punishment mechanism

作　　者：付秋芳[1] 忻莉燕 马士华[3] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学商学院,广州510420 [2]广东寰球广业工程有限公司,广州510655 [3]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第4期56-70,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(13BTY030);广东省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(GD10CGL19)

摘　　要：针对气候变暖下消费者愿意对低碳产品支付更高价格的情境,以及供应链碳减排投入的外部正效应问题,考虑由上游企业的供应商与下游企业的制造商组成的二级供应链,论文研究了供应商与制造商的碳减排投入行为与策略.依据供应商与制造商采用不同的行为策略的支付矩阵,建立了供应商与制造商碳减排投入的演化博弈模型,并分析得到供应商与制造商减排投入行为的演化稳定策略.结果表明:供应商与制造商的碳减排投入策略与双方碳减排投入收益比密切相关,当双方碳减排投入收益比不断变化时,出现多种演化稳定均衡.针对在碳减排投入中供应商或制造商的"搭便车"行为问题,分析了契约与惩罚机制下的演化博弈结果.最后,给出了数值模拟,验证了模型的有效性.Increased consumer preference for low carbon products provides many business opportunities; investment in reducing carbon emissions results in positive externalities in supply chains. This paper investigates the strategy of promoting investment in reducing carbon emissions for suppliers and manufacturers in a two-echelon supply chain under a contract with punishment mechanism. According to the different payoff matrices of suppliers and manufacturers when adopting different strategies,this paper develops an evolutionary game model,and proposes evolutionary stable strategies of investments in reducing carbon emissions for upstream and downstream firms. The results show that investment strategies of suppliers and manufacturers are related to the ratio of input-output. When the input-output ratios of both parties in supply chains change,some evolutionarily stable equilibrium is found. Finally,a numerical verification for the mathematical model is given. If a ‘free rider’can gain a lot in a supply chain,suppliers or manufacturers will not invest in reducing carbon emissions.

关 键 词：供应链 碳减排投入 契约与惩罚机制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]