融资超募、机构投资者持股与股价崩盘——来自我国中小板、创业板市场的经验证据  

IPO Over-financing,Institutional Investors and Stock Crash:Evidence from Small-medium and Growth Enterprises in China

作　　者：李晓龙[1] 胡少柔 王洁玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学会计学院,广东广州510006 [2]海通证券股份有限公司广东分公司,广东广州510623

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2016年第1期78-89,共12页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(7032006);广东省2016年攀登计划项目(pdjh2016b0180);广东省教育厅2015年青年创新人才类项目(2015WQNCX024)

摘　　要：完善我国上市公司新股发行机制和募集资金使用监管,对促进资本市场长效发展具有重要意义。使用2009-2012年我国中小板和创业板的上市公司数据,实证检验发现:在短期内,融资超募与上市公司股价崩盘显著正相关,且机构投资者持股加剧了这种正相关关系。结论表明,上市时的巨额超募资金,并未给上市公司带来"锦上添花"之效用,反而很可能因为公司管理层在上市前隐藏坏消息的逐渐释放,增加个股崩盘风险;而机构投资者的骑乘泡沫行为,更助推了股价的暴涨暴跌。Improving the supervision on IPO and fund raising is important to promote the long-term development of China＇s capital market. Using the data of firms listing on China＇s small-medium and growth enterprises market from 2009 to 2012,this paper shows that the IPO over-financing is significantly positive with the collapse of stock prices and such an effect is strengthened by the presence of institutional share holdings. This result suggests that the IPO over-financing does not bring extra benefits to firms; on the contrary,the risk of stock crash increases as the bad news concealed by the top management teams goes into public and institutional investors boost the extreme up and down of stock prices due to their riding bubble behavior.

关 键 词：融资超募 个股崩盘 机构投资者 骑乘泡沫 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]