感觉运动知识与知觉经验  

Sensorimotor Knowledge and Perceptual Experience

作　　者：孙慧中[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2016年第5期17-21,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"认知科学对哲学的挑战--心灵与认知哲学重大理论问题研究"(11&ZD187)

摘　　要：围绕视觉经验之谜,传统知觉观与生成知觉观的争论焦点在于,个体与环境的感觉运动交互作用是对知觉经验的内容起因果作用,还是构成作用。阿瓦·诺伊的感觉运动理论采取生成的知觉观,认为知觉的本质是对"感觉运动知识"的运用,知觉与行动相互依赖,离开行动无法产生正常的知觉经验,并以"经验盲"作为重要经验证据。但是,感觉运动理论对"经验盲"的构成性假设解释(COH)并没有优越于传统知觉观给出的因果性假设(CAH),也没有排除掉感觉损伤的可能性。"经验盲"的案例并不能作为感觉运动理论的充分证据。结合对行动概念的梳理可以进一步发现,感觉运动理论并未对传统的知觉观构成实质挑战。On the puzzle of visual experience,the main debate between the traditional view and the enactive view is whether the agent’s sensorimotor interaction with the environment plays a causal role or a constitutive role for the content of conscious experiences. Alva Noё’s sensorimotor theory,as an enactive view,holds that the nature of perception is the execution of sensorimotor knowledge,and that perception and action are so interdependent that it is impossible to have normal visual experience without action. ＂ Experiential blindness＂ is an important empirical evidence for sensorimotor theory. However,the constitutive hypothesis（ COH） raised by sensorimotor theory is no better than the causal hypothesis（ CAH） raised by the traditional view,and moreover,COH cannot rule out the possibility of sensory deficits. Thus,the case of ＂ experiential blindness＂ may not be a sufficient evidence for Noё’s sensorimotor theory. By clarifying the notion of action,we can get a further conclusion that Noё’s sensorimotor theory cannot form real challenge for the traditional view of perception.

关 键 词：感觉运动知识 经验盲 知觉 行动 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]