股权性质、公司治理与高管薪酬粘性  

Equity Nature,Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Viscosity

作　　者：薛涛涛[1] 刘宇[1] 郑爱华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2016年第4期65-68,129,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文选取2010-2014年我国A股上市公司数据为样本,研究了我国上市公司存在的高管薪酬粘性问题,以及股权性质、公司治理对高管薪酬粘性的影响。研究表明,我国上市公司普遍存在高管薪酬粘性问题,即高管薪酬在业绩上升时的边际增加量大于业绩下降时的边际减少量;公司治理对抑制高管薪酬粘性有积极的促进作用;相比于非国有企业,国有企业的公司治理水平更能有效抑制高管薪酬粘性的发生。We select the A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2014 as sample to empirically study executive compensation viscosity in China's listed companies,then analyze the influence of the equity nature and corporate governance on the executive compensation viscosity.According to the empirical analysis,we conclude:executive compensation viscosity widely appears in China`s listed companies.When the company's performance rising,executive pay adds more,but when the company's performance falling,executive pay falls less.Corporate governance has a positive role in controlling the viscosity of executive compensation.Compared to the non-state owned enterprises,the level of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises more effectively inhibit the occurrence of executive compensation viscous.

关 键 词：上市公司 薪酬粘性 股权性质 公司治理 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]