公司二元股权结构研究述评和展望  

Review and Outlook of Dual-class Equity Structure Research

作　　者：陆宇建[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2016年第5期86-98,共13页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372096);天津市哲学社会科学研究规划项目(TJGL11-089)

摘　　要：随着以信息和互联网为代表的知识经济的发展,越来越多的企业运用二元股权结构赋予创始股东控制公司董事会、进而控制公司重大经营与财务决策的权利,以激励企业家创业和创新。本文首先分析了公司选用二元股权结构的动因,包括保护企业家和创始股东控制权、防止恶意收购、防止职业经理人的利益侵害和行业需要等。其次,从企业家才能、法治传统和成本与收益权衡等角度分析了二元股权结构中所有权与控制权安排的机理。再次,综述了公司选择二元股权结构的经济后果,包括对股价、回报率和财务业绩的影响,对盈余质量和信息披露质量的影响,相关研究结论是混合的。本文认为,需要加强对二元股权结构的经济学理论基础、适用条件、经济后果和投资者保护机制等问题的研究。With the development of knowledge economy represented by information and internet, more and more companies use dual-class equity structure to give founding shareholders the rights to control the board, and then to control the company＇s big operational and financial decisions to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. Firstly, this paper reviews the literature of motives for using dual-class equity structure, such as protecting entrepreneurs and founding shareholders＇ control rights and interests, preventing hostile takeovers, avoiding the infringement of interests by professional managers and industry needs. Secondly, it analyzes the mechanism of ownership and control arrangements of dual-class equity structure from the perspectives of entrepreneurship, rule of law, and a tradeoff between benefits and costs. Thirdly, it reviews the economic consequences of dual-class equity structure, including its effects on stock prices, rates of returns, financial performance, earnings quality and the quality of information disclosure. Overall, the findings are mixed. This paper argues the needs to strengthen the study of economics theoretical basis, applicable conditions and economic consequences of dual-class equity structure and investor protection mechanism.

关 键 词：创始股东 控制权 二元股权结构 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]