基于演化博弈的产学研协同创新机制研究  

作　　者：林维蔚 石岿然[1] 朱跃钊[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院 [2]南京工业大学

出　　处：《企业经济》2016年第5期58-62,共5页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"供应链成员间的博弈学习与信任关系研究"(项目编号:71071075);国家软科学研究计划重大合作项目"提升南京企业技术创新能力的机理;路径与对策研究--基于"政产学研金介"协同创新视角"(项目编号:2013GXS2D024)

摘　　要：为了探讨产学研协同创新过程的演化并揭示参与者策略行为的影响因素,在有限理性假设基础上,构建了产学研协同创新的演化博弈模型,对单群体和两群体系统的演化稳定性进行了分析。理论分析和数值实验结果表明:双方进行协同创新的概率与协同超额收益正相关、与投入总成本和背叛收益负相关;存在一个最优的超额收益分配系数,使得产学研双方进行协同创新的可能性最大化;合理的惩罚和奖励机制将有效减少双方的背叛行为。In order to study the evolution of process of Industry-University-Research collaborative innovation and reveal the influenc- ing factors of the players＂ strategic behavior, this paper develops an evolutionary game model under the assumption of the player＇s bounded rationality and analyzes the evolutionary stability of one-population and two-population systems. Theo- retical analysis and numerical examples show that the probability of collaborative innovation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess income of collaboration and a negative correlation with total cost of investment and betrayal income. There exists an optimal allocation proportion of excess income which can maximize the probability of collaboration. In ad- dition, the reasonable punishment and reward would effectively reduce the betrayal behavior of both sides.

关 键 词：产学研 协同创新 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 监督与惩罚 

分 类 号：F276.42[经济管理—企业管理]