不公平厌恶下VMI供应链的批发价格契约与协调  

VMI Supply Chain Coordination with Wholesale Price Contract Incorporating Unfair Aversion

作　　者：刘云志[1] 樊治平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110169

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2016年第4期63-73,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务经费资助项目(N140607001;N130606001)

摘　　要：供应链契约是影响VMI供应链整体绩效的重要因素,这是近年来关注的重要研究课题。本文着重研究了由供应商与零售商组成的二级VMI供应链协调问题,在供应商存在不公平厌恶的假设下,依据Cui等提出的不公平厌恶模型刻画了供应商的不利与有利不公平厌恶,通过分析得到了分散VMI供应链情形下供应商的最优策略,同时分析了二级VMI供应链在批发价格契约下的协调情况。通过分析得到的主要结论是:在供应商存在不利不公平厌恶的情形下,供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其不高于传统供应商的最优产品生产量且为不利不公平厌恶系数或零售商势力外生参数的严格减函数或减函数,批发价格契约无法使二级VMI供应链达到协调;在供应商存在有利不公平厌恶的情形下,供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其不低于传统供应商的最优产品生产量且为有利不公平厌恶系数或零售商势力外生参数的严格增函数或增函数,批发价格契约在一定条件下可使二级VMI供应链达到协调。最后,通过数值实验分析验证了本文得出的结论。Supply chain contract is an important factor in affecting the overall performance of VMI supply chain, so the supply chain contract has become a noteworthy research topic recently. In this paper the twostage VMI supply chain coordination problem is investigated with a single supplier and a single retailer. Based on unfair aversion supplier assumption, the supplier＇s disadvantageous unfair aversion and advantageous unfair aversion are portrayed by the unfair aversion model. Then, the supplier＇s optimal strategies are analyzed at the distributed VMI supply chain. And the two-stage VMI supply chain coordination problem with wholesale price contract is studied. By the analysis, the main conclusions can be obtained as follows： for a disadvantageous unfair-averse supplier, there is a unique optimal production quantity which is less than the traditional supplier＇s optimal production quantity and strictly decreases （decreases） with the disadvantageous unfair-averse coefficient （retailer＇s exogenous-force parameter）, the wholesale price con- tract cannot coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain; for a advantageous unfair-averse supplier; there is a unique optimal production quantity which is more than the traditional supplier ＇ s optimal production quantity and strictly increases （increases） with the advantageous unfair-averse coefficient （retailer＇s exogenous-force parameter）, the wholesale price contract can coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain under certain conditions. Finally, numerical examples are used to prove the findings.

关 键 词：VMI 供应链协调 不公平厌恶 批发价格契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] C931[经济管理—国民经济]