考虑损失规避与促销行为的VMI供应链协调契约模型  

VMI Supply Chain Coordination Contract Model Considering Loss Aversion and Promotional Behavior

作　　者：刘云志[1] 樊治平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110167

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2016年第2期22-31,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务经费资助项目(N130606001;N140607001)

摘　　要：针对供应商管理库存(VMI)模式下考虑损失规避型供应商与零售商促销行为的二级供应链协调问题,分别分析了分散VMI供应链情形下损失规避型供应商与零售商的最优策略和集中VMI供应链情形下供应链的最优策略,并构建了批发价格-促销成本分担契约下的VMI供应链协调契约模型,并且证明了该供应链协调契约模型的有效性。通过博弈分析得到的结论是:零售商的促销努力水平的提高能够促使损失规避型供应商增加其产品生产量,而损失规避型供应商的产品生产量的增加会促使零售商提高其促销努力水平以便保持市场竞争优势;批发价格契约不能协调此二级VMI供应链;一定条件下批发价格-促销成本分担契约能够协调此二级VMI供应链。For the two-stage supply chain coordination problem considering the loss-averse supplier and promotional behavior of the retailer, this paper analyzes the optimal strategies under the decentralized and integrated VMI supply chain, respectively. A supply chain coordination contract model is constructed by combining the wholesale price contract and the promotional cost sharing contract, and the validity of the model is proven. By the game analysis; the several conclusions are obtained, i. e. , the improvement of retailer ＇s promotional effort level will make the increase in loss-averse supplier ＇s production volume, while the increase in loss-averse supplier＇s production volume will prompt the improvement of retailer＇s promotional effort level to maintain the retailer＇s competitive advantage; the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain; the contract combined the wholesale price contract and promotional cost sharing contract can coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain under certain conditions.

关 键 词：供应链协调 VMI 损失规避 促销行为 契约模型 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] C931[经济管理—国民经济]