股权结构、代理成本与企业经营绩效  

Corporate Ownership Structure,Agency Cost and Operating Performance

作　　者：张建平[1] 裘丽[1] 刘子亚[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2016年第5期44-49,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：企业经营绩效作为企业在经营活动中追求的重要经营目标,受到很多内外部因素的影响。文章以我国A股上市公司为考察对象,选取了2007-2013年来自2215家公司的12193个观测值,研究了股权集中度、股权性质和代理成本对企业经营绩效的影响,从而揭示出代理问题的存在对企业运营所产生的经济后果。研究结果表明,第一大股东持股比例越高,企业经营绩效越好;国有企业的经营绩效显著低于民营企业。整体而言,代理成本越高,企业的经营绩效越差,但对于民营企业而言,第二类代理成本的影响不显著,体现出民营企业不存在明显的大股东掠夺小股东的现象。Enterprise operating performance as an important business goal in business activities, affected by many internal and external factors. This paper selected Cbina＇s A-share listed companies as research objectives, and obtained 12193 pieces of observation data from 2215 companies between 2007-2013. The research focuses on the effect of ownership concentration, ownership property and agency cost on corporate operating performance, and reveals the economic consequences of corporate operations which influenced by the existence of agency problem. The results of the research show that the higher the proportion of the first major shareholder, the better the corporate operating performance; and the operating performance of state-owned enterprises is significantly lower than that of private enterprises. Overall, the higher the agency cost, the worse the corporate operating performance. But for the private enterprises, the second type agency cost does not have a significant impact, which denies the hypothesis that large shareholders expropriate small shareholders in private enterprises.

关 键 词：股权结构 代理成本 经营绩效 企业运营 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]