银企联盟供应链融资风险规避策略研究  

Research on Supply Chain Financing Risk Based on the Bank Enterprise Alliance

作　　者：吴士健[1] 乔凤敏 孙向彦 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经管学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《湖南商学院学报》2016年第2期104-108,共5页Journal of Hunan Business College

基　　金：山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(项目编号:BS2013SF019);第55批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(项目编号:2014M551937);青岛市软科学项目(项目编号:13-1-3-139-8-(1)-zhc);山东科技大学科研创新团队支持计划(项目编号:2015TDJH103)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论分析了商业银行与供应链融资联盟核心企业之间、商业银行与融资企业之间及联盟核心企业与融资企业之间信息不对称所导致的融资风险问题,构建了核心企业、商业银行与融资企业间不完全信息动态博弈模型,给出了各方博弈均衡求解;运用非线性约束最优化方法分析了核心企业、融资企业之间串谋最小倾向的最优约束条件,给出了降低代理人违约倾向,防范供应链融资风险的对策建议。Based on principal-agent theory, the paper studies the financing risk of the bank-enterprise alliance supply chain caused by information asymmetry between commercial banks and enterprise at the core of the supply chain, commercial banks and financing enterprise, enterprise at the core of the supply chain and financing enterprise, constructing the incomplete information dynamic game model among the core enterprises, commercial bank and financing enterprise, finding the game equilibrium solution;using nonlinear constrained optimization method to solve the optimal constraint conditions of the minimum tendency of the collusion between core enterprise and financing enterprise, and giving some advice on reducing the agent＇s default tendency and avoiding financing risk of the bank-enterprise alliance supply chain.

关 键 词：委托代理 银企联盟 供应链融资 道德风险 

分 类 号：F275.6[经济管理—企业管理] F830.5[经济管理—国民经济]