关于奎因的本体论标准的批判  

Critique of Quine's Ontological Criterion

作　　者：董英东[1,2] 何向东[2] 

机构地区：[1]贵州工程应用技术学院逻辑与文化研究中心,贵州毕节551700 [2]西南大学政治与公共管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2016年第3期44-48,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(12AZD073);国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB018);国家社科基金项目(11BZX062);教育部人文社科研究西部项目(12XJA7204001);高层次人才项目(G2012002);贵州省优秀科技教育人才省长基金资助项目(201250);第54批博士后面上资助工程项目(2013M542251)

摘　　要：奎因提出的本体论承诺的逻辑或语言的标准主要是为了讨论本体论承诺和语义之间的关系,是关于一阶语句的形式分析。对奎因的本体论承诺标准的批判主要有两条可能的进路,其一是对本体论标准的哲学价值的批判分析,其二是对奎因的系统化方法的局限性进行批判。语言逻辑的研究由外延研究向内涵研究的转变同样与探索本体论承诺有关。霍奇和拉约分别从这两方面对奎因的本体论标准进行了批判。Quine＇s logic / language criterion for ontological commitment is a starting point for a discussion of the correlation between ontological commitment and semantics. There are some peculiarities of Quine＇s criterion for ontological commitment,which is formulated for first-order sentences. There are two possible lines of criticism of Quine＇s criterion. One is caused by problems in its philosophical implications,and the other is by the limitations of the method of regimentation employed by Quine. It shifts from extensional to intensional logical languages in order to explore the notion of ontological commitment as such. Hoges and Rayo criticize Quine＇s ontology criterion from the two aspects respectively.

关 键 词：本体论 承诺 批判 存在 逻辑 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]