团队异质性、管理层持股与企业风险行为  

Heterogeneity of top management team,managerial ownership,and risk taking

作　　者：陈闯[1] 吴晓晖[1] 卫芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第5期1-13,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172056;71102056);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目

摘　　要：代理理论认为解决经理人过度保守主要需要依靠让经理人拥有更多股权.高阶理论则认为企业决策团队的统计性特征与认知将会影响企业的风险行为.文章通过整合代理理论和高阶理论,为预测企业风险行为建立了更精细的模型.利用中国中小板与创业板的上市企业对这一理论进行了检验.具体而言,任期异质性会抑制企业的风险行为,职能异质性则会促进企业风险行为.与代理理论预期的相反,发现增加管理者持股比例,将会降低企业风险行为,并且这种抑制性作用也体现在降低职能异质性对风险行为的正向影响方面.Agency theory argues that managers should be given more equity ownership to mitigate their risk aversion. However, the upper echelons theory suggests that the demographic characteristics and the cognition of the corporate decision-making team would affect the risk taking. This paper provides a sophisticated risk taking model by incorporating agency theory and upper echelons literature. Authors empirical analysis is based on da- ta from Chinese firms listed on the SME Board and ChiNext Board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Specific- ally, the paper tenure heterogeneity will suppress risk taking and functional heterogeneity will promote enter- prise risk taking. What＇ s more, contrary to agency theory, the paper that the increase in the proportion of managerial ownership will reduce risk taking. A higher managerial ownership will weaken the positive relation- ship between the functions heterogeneity and risk taking.

关 键 词：企业风险行为 任期异质性 职能异质性 管理层持股 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]