新闻媒体的监督功能:基于上市公司并购事件的分析  

The Monitoring Role of Media： Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions of Listed Companies

作　　者：黄俊[1] 李挺[1] 李娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2015年第4期431-452,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102136、71272008、71372038);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(14JJD630010);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2013BGL008);上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(14ZS078);上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助

摘　　要：本文以2007--2013年上市公司并购事件为研究对象，考察了媒体报道对管理层并购决策行为的影响，以探究新闻媒体的舆论监督职能。研究发现，对于价值有损型并购，媒体报道数量越多，公司管理层放弃执行并购的概率越大，且这一影响主要通过负面新闻报道产生。进一步的考察显示，当并购宣告日市场反应越差或并购方为国有企业时，媒体报道对价值有损型并购的抑制作用越明显，而且媒体报道有助于弱化并购公司政治关联背景对并购决策的不利影响。最后，我们的分析表明，当管理层宣告放弃执行价值有损型并购时，公司存在正的累计超额收益，由此进一步验证了新闻媒体对公司并购决策的监督作用。This paper studies corporate acquisitions of listed companies from 2007 to 2013 to investigate the impact of media coverage on manager＇s acquisition decisions and shed light on the monitoring role of media. It is found that the more media attention to the pro posed value-destroying acquisitions, the more likely acquisitions are abandoned. This result mainly concentrates on negative media reports. Further analyses show that the monitoring role of media in corporate acquisition is more pronounced when the market reaction to acquisi tions is more negative and the merge is taken by SOEs. In addition, media reports weaken the adverse effect of political connection on corporate acquisition. Finally, when firms abandon value-destroying acquisitions, there are positive stock returns, suggesting the positive role of media in corporate acquisition.

关 键 词：媒体监督 价值有损型并购 累计超额收益 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]