排污权交易市场中企业行为演化博弈分析  

Analysis of enterprises' behavior in trading emission permits market based on evolutionary game

作　　者：仇蕾[1,2] 张廷熙 王瑜梁[2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室,江苏南京210098 [2]河海大学管理科学研究所,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《水利经济》2016年第3期5-9,79,共5页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD214);江苏省社会科学基金重点项目(15GLA005)

摘　　要：借助演化博弈理论,建立无政府监督管理和存在政府监督管理两种情形下排污权交易企业双方之间的博弈模型,探讨交易双方行为决策的动态演化过程、稳定演化策略及其对应条件。结果表明:在无政府监督管理情况下,排污权交易企业买卖双方只存在唯一稳定演化策略,即(违反规则,违反规则);当政府对排污权交易市场进行监督管理,并制定合理的激励惩罚机制后,交易企业出于自身利益最大化考虑,均逐渐向(遵守规则,遵守规则)演化。为了提升排污权交易市场效率,政府必需加强监督管理,制定有效的激励惩罚机制,完善监督管理体系。The game models for the enterprises with trading emission permits in the two cases of non-governmental supervision and governmental supervision are established based on the evolutionary game theory. The dynamic evolution processes,stable evolution strategies and the corresponding conditions of the behavioral decision of both sides are discussed.The results show that in the case of non-governmental supervision,there is only one evolutionarily stable strategy（ violating the rules） between buyers and sellers. While in the case that the government supervises the emission trading market and sets reasonable penalties and incentives mechanism,the enterprises gradually move to the evolutionary behavior（ obeying the rules） for the consideration of their own maximum benefits.In order to improve the efficiency of the emission trading market,the government should strengthen the supervision,formulate effective incentive mechanism and improve the regulatory system.

关 键 词：排污权 演化博弈 进化稳定策略 市场 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]