基于腐败风险的司法腐败博弈模型及防治对策  

Judicial Corruption Game Model and Control Strategy Based on Corruption Risk

作　　者：李书金[1] 马秀娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央司法警官学院研究所,河北保定071000 [2]河北大学图书馆,河北保定071002

出　　处：《河北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第3期152-160,共9页Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：河北省社会科学基金项目(HB15GL001)

摘　　要：司法腐败产生的微观原因在于司法人员对最大化个人收益的追求,以个人理性为基本假设的博弈论,是研究行为人发生相互作用时的决策及决策均衡问题的一门学科。以司法审判为研究背景,通过构建风险情形下法官司法腐败的一般化博弈模型来解读司法腐败现象,从博弈均衡角度揭示司法腐败局中人间策略选择规律,进而从加大腐败风险角度提出构建司法腐败防治机制的相关对策及建议。The microscopic reason for judicial corruption lies in the legal staff pursuing the maximum individual benefits,and as the basic assumption of individual rationality,game theory is a subject that studies the decision making and the equilibrium problem of the behavior when people interact with each other.This paper constructs generalized judicial corruption game model based on risk to analyze the phenomenon of judicial corruption and from the point of view of game equilibrium,reveals the law of human strategy choice in the judicial corruption,and then puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to construct the mechanism of judicial corruption prevention and control system from the perspective of increasing the risk of corruption.

关 键 词：司法腐败 非合作博弈 NASH均衡 防治策略 

分 类 号：D917.6[政治法律—法学]