纵向竞争、企业税负与加成率——基于中国装备制造企业的实证检验  

Vertical Competition,Corporate Tax and Markups——An Empirical Study Based on the Equipment Manufacturing Enterprises in China

作　　者：任曙明[1] 郭彤[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2016年第5期27-41,共15页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573031);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103023)

摘　　要：以2002年企业所得税分享改革为契机,在拟自然实验框架下,选取中国工业企业数据库1999—2007年间装备制造业企业的非平衡面板数据为样本,采用多重差分法、PSM-DID法等方法验证了纵向竞争对企业实际税负及加成率的作用效果及其机制。研究结果表明,纵向税收竞争会导致地方政府对装备制造企业的征税努力下降,装备制造企业实际税率下降1.46%,加成率水平提高5.02%,且企业实际税率每增加1个单位,加成率下降2.15%;此外,纵向竞争对企业加成率的影响与企业规模和融资约束有关。The Corporate Income Tax Reform in 2002 provides us with a natural experiment framework. In this paper, we verify the effects of vertical competition to corporate effective tax rates and markups using multi-difference, PSM DID and other methods, based on unbalanced panel data of 126467 Chinese equipment manufacturing enterprises from 1999 to 2007. We draw conclusions that vertical competition weakens the taxation efforts of local government on equipment manufacturing enterprises, reduces the effective tax rate by 1.46% and increases the markups by 5.02%. In addition, firm sizes and financing constraints can influence this mechanism. Our conclusions will provide experience supports and policy implications for Chinese supply-side reform.

关 键 词：纵向竞争 加成率 企业税负 装备制造 

分 类 号：F271.3[经济管理—企业管理]