关系型交易、控制权配置与公司税收规避  

Relationship-Based Transaction,Control Rights Allocation and Corporate Tax Avoidance

作　　者：代彬[1] 彭程[2] 刘星[3] 

机构地区：[1]四川外国语大学国际商学院/国别经济与国际商务研究中心 [2]四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心 [3]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2016年第6期59-70,共12页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"控制权配置;审计监督与国企高管自利行为"(项目编号:71402109);国家自然科学基金重点项目"制度环境;公司财务政策选择和动态演化研究"(项目编号:71232004);国家社会科学基金项目"企业投融资互动决策及其社会效益的实现研究"(项目编号:10XGL004);重庆市社会科学规划项目"重庆企业实施跨国直接投资战略研究"(项目编号:2012QNGL054);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目"国际产业转移与重庆市制造业升级研究"(项目编号:KJ131002);重庆市教委人文社科研究重点项目"我国创业板上市公司控制权配置;管理层防御与企业成长性研究"(项目编号:16SKGH102)

摘　　要：关系型交易和内部权力配置作为重要的公司治理安排都将对企业的避税决策产生影响,这一观点虽被广泛接受但缺乏经验证据的佐证。笔者以2008—2014年的A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,实证发现:随着与供应商/客户关系型交易比重的提升,公司的税收激进水平越严重,表明企业避税行为越会受商业战略的影响;高管控制权的增强会进一步强化关系型交易与公司激进避税行为的正向关系,揭示企业的财务决策可能蕴含了强权高管的自利性动机。进一步的研究发现,当公司面临更强的市场竞争压力和拥有较低的多元化程度时,关系型交易对企业激进避税的促进作用更为显著,不过高管控制权原有的正向调节效应却受到明显弱化。笔者的研究结论为当前有关优化利益相关者共同治理模式以及加强管理层财务决策监督的政策导向提供了经验启示。As important corporate governance arrangements,both relationship-based transaction and internal power distribution would have more or less influence on the firm＇s tax avoidance. Though widely accepted,it is still lack of empirical evidences. Based on the data of A-share listed manufacturing companies from2008 to 2014,the empirical study shows that： as the proportion of relationship-based transaction with suppliers / customers rises,firm＇s tax aggressiveness behavior could be interpreted as an indication of the influence of business strategy upon firm＇s tax evasion decision; enhanced executives＇ control rights would further strengthen the proportionate relationship between the aggressive tax avoidance and the relationship-based transaction,revealing that corporate financial decisions may contain selfish motives of powerful executives. Further study indicates that relationship-based transaction can further boost firm＇s tax aggressiveness when the company is facing stronger market competition and lower degree of diversification,yet the original positive moderating effect from executives＇ control power would be significantly weakened. The results of this study provide valuable policy guidelines and theoretical enlightenment for the optimization of stakeholders＇ co-governance mode and enhancing the supervision of CEO＇s financial decisions.

关 键 词：关系型交易 高管控制权 激进避税 关系治理 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]