基于Stackelberg博弈的R&D联盟知识转移决策模型  

A knowledge transfer decision model of R&D alliance based on the Stackelberg game

作　　者：王智生[1] 李慧颖[2] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021 [2]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《科研管理》2016年第6期74-83,共10页Science Research Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费.华侨大学哲学社会科学青年学者成长工程项目(13SKGC-QG11);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(20720151175);福建省社会科学规划青年项目(FJ2015C116);福建省软科学计划项目(2016R0056)~~

摘　　要：R&D联盟合作知识创新逐渐得到学者们的关注,其中联盟企业的知识转移决策对联盟合作创新结果具有重要影响。借鉴知识生产函数将R&D联盟合作创新的动态演进过程抽象为一个两阶段的知识转移决策Stackelberg博弈模型,从是否考虑前期知识投入对R&D联盟知识转移决策进行博弈分析,得到盟主企业愿意将知识转移到联盟中的比率与其自身的知识边际收益正相关,与合作伙伴知识边际收益负相关,一定条件下盟主企业知识转移意愿、前期知识投入与知识边际收益三者正相关。Collaborative knowledge creation between the R＆D Alliance has gradually received considerable attention in the recent literature, and the knowledge transfer decision of the alliance enterprises has an important impact on the results of the alliance collaborative innovation. Learning from the knowledge production function and using the game theoretic framework, we modeled the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation as a two - stage Staekelberg game of knowledge transfer decisions. Spe- cifically, we modeled two scenarios, the first in which consortia participants take current efforts into account only, and the second in which consortia participants have expanded the prior knowledge input. The equilibrium values of current efforts in knowledge creation, the leader＇ s knowledge transfer rate, and the total expected system gain in both of two scenarios were determined. It is found that the leader＇s knowledge transfer rate is positively related to its knowledge marginal revenue, and negatively related to the follower＇ s marginal revenue. Furthermore, in certain conditions, the leader＇s intention of knowledge transfer is positively re- lated to prior knowledge input and knowledge marginal revenue.

关 键 词：R&D联盟 知识转移 合作知识创新 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]