政府干预下的会计权力配置与管理会计信息决策有用性  

The Designation of Accounting Authority and Decision Usefulness of Management Accounting Information under Government Interventions

作　　者：邓博夫[1] 李子扬[2] 毛洪涛[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学博士后流动站,611130 [2]北京大学博士后流动站,100089 [3]西南财经大学会计学院,611130

出　　处：《会计研究》2016年第5期63-70,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71172228);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-09-0658);财政部"全国会计领军(后备)人才(学术类)培养项目";西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK130508);中国博士后科学基金第57批面上项目(2015M572489)的资助

摘　　要：本文采用问卷调查的方法考察了政府干预下的会计权力配置模式对国有企业管理会计信息决策有用性的影响。研究发现,随着市场竞争程度的增加,企业上级单位会赋予下级经营业务单元更多的经营自主权和会计决策权,这种与外部环境适应的分权模式可以有效提升管理会计信息的决策有用性。进一步发现,政府干预对于管理会计信息系统存在两种不同的效应:约束效应和推动效应,前者即政府通过约束企业上下级单位之间的分权程度,间接降低管理会计信息决策有用性;后者即政府通过推动企业管理水平的提升直接增强管理会计信息决策有用性。This paper uses survey data to investigate effect of accounting authority allocation under government interventions on decision usefulness of management accounting information decision usefulness within SOEs. The study finds that the superior authorities may authorize more operational decision rights and corresponding accounting authority to lower business units along with increasing market competition. The decentralization pattern adapted to the external environment can promote its decision usefulness. It also finds that political constraints and promotion effect of government interventions are existed in management accounting system; the former effect means government indirectly impairs the decision usefulness by constraining decentralization degree between the superior and subordinate units; the later effect means that government directly promotes the decision usefulness by improving management level.

关 键 词：政府干预 约束效应 推动效应 会计分权 管理会计信息决策有用性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]