考虑关键组件质量设计的闭环供应链定价策略与协调  

The Pricing Strategies and Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Key Components Quality Design

作　　者：唐娟[1] 李帮义[2] 刘志[1,2] 龚本刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学管理工程学院,安徽芜湖241001 [2]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2016年第12期208-212,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目"发展循环经济与中国特色的再制造产业协调发展研究"(13AZD062);国家自然科学基金资助项目"物联网环境下面向能源效率的制造企业生产计划与排产方法研究"(71171002);安徽省高等教育提升计划省级项目"再制造闭环供应链产品设计策略选择及双向责任分担机制研究"(TSSK2015B26)

摘　　要：研究关键组件供应商和制造商组成的闭环供应链在集中决策和分散决策下的定价、组件质量设计投入和废旧产品回收投入的决策问题,分析组件质量设计产出效应和废旧产品回收产出效应对决策的影响,探讨基于讨价还价博弈的两部定价契约对分散决策的协调作用。研究结果表明,组件质量设计投入、废旧产品回收投入和供应链利润都与质量设计产出效应和废旧产品回收产出效应正相关;基于讨价还价博弈的两部定价契约可实现闭环供应链的协调。This paper considers the closed- loop supply chain（ CLSC） consisted by a key components supplier and a remanufacturer. Based on the analysis of the impact of key components quality on the market demand,the pricing strategies of the CLSC,the design of key component quality and the effect of waste product recycling were analyzed in the centralized and decentralized decision- making models. Furthermore,the coordination of decentralized decision model resulting from the two- part tariff contract based on the bargaining game was discussed. The results show that the key component quality design input,waste product recycling and supply chain profit are positively correlated to the output effects of quality design and the waste products recycling. The two- part tariff contract based on the bargaining game can achieve the CLSC coordination.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 关键组件 质量设计 讨价还价博弈 两部定价契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]