环境规制下地方政府与企业博弈行为分析  

作　　者：佟岩[1] 贾李盼 

机构地区：[1]沈阳大学经济学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2016年第6期33-36,共4页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：辽宁省社科联课题"辽宁经济增长与环境协调发展的对策建议"(项目编号:2013lslktzijix-50);辽宁省教育厅课题"环境政策约束下的辽宁省产业结构调整研究"(项目编号:w2014289)

摘　　要：分析了完全信息下地方政府和企业的静态博弈和混合策略博弈,得出企业污染环境的额外收益、声誉成本和政府的监管成本、政治成本都影响两者行为的选择的结论。引入贴现因子,分析了多阶段动态重复博弈,发现企业未来的选择与贴现因子的大小密切相关。从3个方面提出了促进改善两者行为的政策建议,首先应该建立合理的制度,使用合理的规制工具;其次,提高政府的监管效率,加大惩罚力度;最后,积极开展技术创新,从根本上降低污染成本。This paper analyzes static game and mixed strategy game between local government and enterprise under the complete in- formation and concludes that enterprise environmental pollution cost, reputation, government regulation and political cost can affect the behaviors of the two games. After introducing the discount factor, it discusses the multistage dynamic repeat- ed game and points out that the choice of the enterprise in the future is closely related to discount factor. Several policy suggestions are put forward from four aspects to promote the improvement of both behaviors, including the establishment of a reasonable system and reasonable regulation tools, improving the efficiency of government regulation and increasing the intensity of punishment, and developing technical innovation to reduce pollution cost.

关 键 词：地方政府 环境规制 企业 博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]