基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析  

Analysis of Two-sided Platform's Pricing Strategy Based on the Preference of Commodity Quality

作　　者：薛蓉娜[1] 赵合[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学,西安710061

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2016年第6期66-72,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"‘三网融合’模式下电信运营商竞争策略设计与公共政策:基于双边市场理论的研究"(项目编号:71173172)

摘　　要：本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属(接入)寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明:在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。This paper studies the problem of the platform pricing in two-sided market of monopoly or single- homing oligopoly,which is consisted of a group of customers and a group of sellers,considering the commodity or service quality provided by sellers. The results show： in the case of monopoly market,the access fees of the customers and the sellers are related to the coefficients of quality sensitivity and coefficients of unit quality cost,and the platform has the incentive to encourage qualified users to access. In the case of the single-homing oligopoly,if there is no quality difference between platforms,the platform tends to set high prices and obtain the surplus value of the bilateral market caused by the quality of goods,but both sides would not improve the quality; if the quality gap between the platform is small and the quality information is opaque,with the quality gap becoming larger,the higher quality platform will improve the access fees and its consumers number will increase; on the contrary,when the quality information is not opaque,in order to maintain the market share,the lower quality platform would set its price gap with another platform which is proportion to the quality gap in customer＇s market,and inverse proportion in the seller＇s market.

关 键 词：双边市场 商品质量 接入费用 垄断市场 单归属 定价策略 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]