考虑信息泄露的供应链成员决策研究  

The Supply Chain Members' Decision-Making Considering Information Leakage

作　　者：邱小平[1,2,3] 李娜[1] 马丽娜[1] 李英波[4] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031 [2]综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都610031 [3]综合运输四川省重点实验室,四川成都610031 [4]神龙汽车有限公司,湖北武汉430056

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（理学版）》2016年第3期261-267,共7页Journal of Wuhan University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61175055);国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL013);高等学校博士学位点专项科研基金-新教师课题资助项目(20090184120018);四川省科技支持计划资助项目(2013GZX0167)

摘　　要：为了分析两个竞争型制造商同时制定批发价格时供应链成员决策,针对具有可替代性的产品,在伯川德竞争下建立了收益共享契约下由一个供应商和两个竞争型制造商组成的基本模型,探讨了信息泄露和不泄露时制造商产品定价决策,分析了批发价格外生和内生时供应商的信息泄露决策.研究表明:批发价格内生时,无论供应商是否泄露市场需求状态信息,产品最优批发价格的设置只与收益分享率和产品的可替代性有关,且最优批发价格随着收益分享率的增大而降低,随着产品替代系数的增大而增大.In order to study strategies of the supply chain members under price competition when two competing manufacturers make wholesale prices simultaneously, a basic model consisting of one supplier and two competing man- ufacturers is established. The selling products are alternative and subject to Bertrand competition. The different pri- cing strategies of two manufacturers are discussed under the condition of information confidentiality and information leakage. The information leakage decisions of the supplier are analyzed when the wholesale price is exogenous and en- dogenous. The results are as follows., when the wholesale price is endogenous, whether with information leakage or not, the optimal wholesale price is only related to the revenue sharing rate and the substitutability of product. The op- timal wholesale price decreases with the increase of the revenue sharing rate, and increases with the increase of the substitution coefficient of product.

关 键 词：伯川德竞争 信息泄露 收益共享 供应链 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]