弱利益无关者更有助于内控监督吗?  

Is Comparative Interest-irrelevancy More Conductive to Internal Control Supervision?

作　　者：左拙人 

机构地区：[1]南京大学管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2016年第7期150-159,共10页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372033)

摘　　要：加强上市公司尤其是国有上市公司的内部控制建设,形成可靠有效的内控机制,毫无疑问有利于资本市场及企业治理制度的健全完善和上市公司的健康稳定发展,更是深化国企改革工作的重要着力点之一。文章在制度财务学的框架下,将制度嵌入上市公司价值链,剖析演绎弱利益无关者在上市公司以价值创造为导向的监督机制中的相对优势地位和积极意义,认为中国现阶段采取的董事会、监事会并存的"双制度"在结构组成上对于提升内部控制效果仍有潜力可挖,将弱利益无关者引入以实现向真正"双独立制度"的转变将是加强并完善上市公司内部控制有效性的重要办法。Strengthening the internal control system of listed firms（especially state-owned listed firms）and building the reli？able and effective internal control mechanism are conducive to a perfect,stable and healthy development of capital market and corporate governance without any doubts,which is also an important stand point of state-owned firms’reform. In the framework of institutional finance with inserting the listed firm’s value chain,this paper analyzes and interprets the advantag？es of comparative interest-irrelevancy in“value creation-oriented”monitoring mechanisms of listed firms. We find that there are still potential advantages of current“double independence system”of boards and supervisions for enhancing the effective？ness of internal controls in Chinese mainland firms. Bringing in the comparative interest-irrelevancy to achieve the real“dou？ble independence system”will be an important way to strengthen the effectiveness of internal control.

关 键 词：弱利益无关者 独立监事 内部控制 独立董事 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]